Viacom is likely to ultimately prevail in its appeal of the lower Court decision in the seminal Viacom vs. Google-YouTube copyright infringement case.

  • If one only reads either the lower court’s decision or the press reports of it, without considering likely appellate arguments and the broader constitutional context of copyright protection, it is easy to missread the likely ultimate outcome here.
  • Both sides agreed to an expedited summary judgment process in the lower court, because both sides fully expected this case to ultimately be decided at the appellate level, and most likely by the U.S. Supreme Court.
  • Expect the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New York to decide Viacom’s appeal in 2011 and the Supreme Court to likely take the case and decide it in 2012 — given how central this case is to maintaining copyright protection in the Internet age.

Why is Viacom likely to prevail on appeal?

Like Grokster Case: First, this seminal DMCA case is analogous to court process outcome of the seminal Grokster case, where the video-sharing copyright-infringer Grokster originally won in the lower court and in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, before losing unanimously (9-0) in the Supreme Court in 2005.

Grokster Precedent is Highly Relevant: Second, Judge Stanton summarily dismissed any legal relevance of the 2005 Supreme Court Grokster precedent that has the effect of law, despite the fact that Google-YouTube’s video-sharing technology and behavior functionally produce the same copyright-infringing result that Grokster’s video-sharing technology and behavior did.

  • The only real difference here is the technology used. Grokster employed p-2-p software to enable user video-sharing/piracy to massively infringe copyrights, whereas Google-YouTube used standard public website software to enable user video-sharing/piracy to massively infringe copyrights.
  • By ignoring the Supreme Court’s settled law here, the lower court’s myopic logic implicitly would condone Grokster-like piracy — if it is effectively laundered or fenced via a public website that ostensibly has other legitimate purposes.
    • It is unlikely that the Supreme Court will defend constitutional copyright protections with one user-video-sharing technology and not another.
      • That would be the functional equivalent of saying that it is only burglary if the thief absconds with stolen goods through the back window, but not the front door.
    • It is also unlikely that the Supreme Court will accept the perverse logic of the lower court, which rejected the relevance of the Grokster case essentially because the p-2-p offenders were total-pirates, while Google-YouTube is only a part-time-pirate.
      • This lower court logic would effectively eviscerate the Grokster Supreme Court precedent by condoning doing wrong, as long as one is also doing good.
    • Case law is replete with findings that theft is theft, it isn’t reclassified as legal just because the entity that commits the theft has otherwise been engaged in legitimate business or activities.

Copyright is Constitutionally Protected: Third, the lower court decision effectively eviscerates constitutional copyright protections and the Copyright Act by condoning mass Internet copyright infringement by websites under the DMCA — as long as they technically pull down specific offending copyrighted works when specifically-notified under DMCA procedures.

  • Probably the core fatal flaw in the lower Court’s opinion is its narrow and myopic legal frame of the case as simply a narrow arbitration decision of technical DMCA take-down procedures and interpretations of words — in contrast to a case on the merits of alleged willful and deliberate mass-infringement of copyrights under the Copyright Act to facilitate the creation of a extremely valuable, dominant, and lasting market-leading online video enterprise.
    • To listen to Judge Stanton’s legal frame, the only thing that matters here is his ruling of whether Google had “specific” knowledge of copyright infringement, not just “general” knowledge of mass copyright infringement.
      • This is like saying those that willingly fence stolen property, or knowingly launder the ill-gotten proceeds from stolen property, are not involved in, or culpable for, an illegal conspiracy to steal property.
  • In approaching this case with an ever-narrowing legal lens, Judge Stanton’s decision spirals away from the:
    • Essential context of the case — that copyright protections are tethered directly to the U.S. Constitution; and
    • Important context of the purpose of the DMCA, which attempts to balance copyright protection with the need for liability protection for Internet Service Providers from users’ actions that they do not control.
  • It was never Congress’ intent to sanction the perverse Judge Stanton outcome of a de facto criminal safe harbor for those who are:
    • Well aware of mass copyright infringement on their platform;
    • Actively encouraging infringement for monetary gain;
    • Premeditatedly gaming the legal system to evade responsibility and accountability; and
    • Willing to steal up until the point that, and as long as, the party being stolen from does not formally complain of the theft with the “actual” serial #s of the stolen goods.
  • In putting all his legal eggs-in-one-basket, the DMCA’s specific take-down obligations, the ruling effectively converts the DMCA into universal get-out-of-jail-free card for those who effectively fence or launder copyrighted works on a massive scale.

Judge Ignored the Facts: Fourth, Judge Stanton basically ignored most all the facts of the case.

  • While admitting in his opinion and order that: “a jury could find that the defendants not only were generally aware of, but welcomed copyright-infringing material being placed on their website“… the Judge basically ignored all of Viacom’s evidence of Copyright Act abuses by narrowly absolving Google of all copyright infringement responsibility because Google immediately pulled down any infringing videos once formally notified under the DMCA safe harbor take down procedures.
  • Judge Stanton is totally ignoring the undisputed facts of the case that:
    • YouTube was facilitating rapid growth of YouTube by encouraging mass uploads of copyrighted works right after the Supreme Court’s unanimous Grokster decision;
    • Google was well aware that they were adopting a risky copyright infringement strategy in acquiring YouTube and adopting their infringement strategy to leverage its first mover market position; and
    • Viacom and Google were in active negotiations with Google-YouTube on a licensing deal for Viacom’s infringed content for well over a year before they collapsed and Viacom filed DMCA takedown notices with Google-YouTube.
  • By totally ignoring the facts and the context of the case, the Judge’s ruling is basically declaring “open season” on copyright holders.
    • Judge Stanton effectively has absolved bad actors of any need to respect copyright, by encouraging them to infringe first, engage in and slow roll negotiations with copyright owners, and then take down the copyrighted works only if and when asked — and after the bad actor has built up a user base and a business around the infringing behavior.
  • This legal frame is the functional equivalent of a reverse statute of limitations and no Copyright Act, where a copyright owner has no protections until they comb the Internet, discover, and specifically file a formal and specific DMCA takedown notice.
  • For Judge Stanton’s ruling to withstand appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and/or the Supreme Court would have to effectively rule that the DMCA trumps/supercedes the Copyright Act and the U.S. Constitutional protections of copyright. That is not likely.

In sum, Viacom is likely to win on appeal because of the import and relevance of the Supreme Court’s Grokster precedent, and because Judge Stanton essentially ignored the Copyright Act, the Constitution, and the facts of the case.

 

Google has much to lose in its ill-advised PR and public policy war with Apple, its previous closest Silicon Valley ally.

Antitrust or Fiduciary liablility? Google’s recent market behavior puts Google and its CEO Eric Schmidt in a lose-lose situation.

  • Remember this time last year the FTC began investigating Google and Apple for potentially collusive over-lapping board seats, despite Mr. Schmidt’s assertion at the time that Apple was not a “primary competitor” to Google.
    • Mr. Schmidt resigned from the Apple board under FTC pressure in August 2009.
  • Google and its CEO are now in a real pickle:
    • Either Google’s very recent competitive entry into competition with Apple’s: iPhone (Droid), iPad (Google Tablet), AdMob, Apple TV (Google TV), and ITunes (Google Music) — is prima facie evidence that Mr. Schmidt was colluding with Apple to not compete before… OR Google CEO Eric Schmidt is under intense personal risk of having violated his personal fiduciary duty as an Apple Director to protect and advance the interests of Apple and its shareholders.
    • It’s hard to believe that Google has been able to launch all these new direct competitive alternatives to Apple: Droid, Google Tablet, AdMob, Google TV, and Google Music, in just the last year, with no involvement of Google CEO Eric Schmidt, who should have recused himself because of his intimate knowledge of Apple’s business, strategy, innovation secrets, and product launch timetable.
    • This makes the Apple patent infringement suit against HTC a very serious threat to Google CEO Eric Schmidt personally, given his longtime fiduciary duty to protect Apple and its shareholders from when he was a Apple Director.
      • While the official legal target of the suit was Google supplier HTC, I believe the real goal is to gain legal discovery/depositions of Mr. Schmidt and all his product managers of
        Droid, and possibly Google Tablet, AdMob, Google TV, and Google Music.
      • If legal discovery of Google’s emails and other records find that Mr. Schmidt passed on any knowledge of Apple’s plans or trade secrets, Google, and Mr. Schmidt personally, are at serious legal risk.
        • Moreover, this is not hypothetical risk, given what has been learned of Google’s “Freewheeling culture” from Viacom’s depositions against Google-YouTube.
        • If Google handled its launches of its phone, tablet, mobile, TV, and music businesses anything like they handled their entry into video via YouTube, this serious personal fiduciary liability Mr. Schmidt faces could turn out to be the most serious risk yet to Google’s long term leadership stability.

Brand Liability: Apple’s longstanding innovation leadership as a closed proprietary system, undermines Google mantra and claim that openness is the key to innovation. Google’s attacks on Google for being closed, will only invite more attention to Google’s self-serving openness double standard, where it pushes openness where it facilitates Google entering new businesses with a competition-killing, cross-subsidized free offering, but where Google fiercely resists any openness regarding its opaque black box monopoly markets of search and search advertising — the place openness is most needed.

  • Google’s attempts to brand Apple as anti-innovation defies common sense and widespread personal experience, and it only invites comparison to where Google is not at all open, despite its boasts to the contrary.

Privacy Liability: Google’s pervasive invasion of privacy is a huge franchise liability for Google. Google collects more private information about more people without permission than any entity in the world. (See Chart: “Google’s Total Information Awareness Power”)

  • Per USAToday:
    • The debate was on vivid display again during the D8 tech conference this month, when Apple CEO Steve Jobs weighed in on the topic. “Privacy means people know what they are signing up for in plain English,” he said. “Some people want to share more data. Ask them. Ask them every time. Let them know precisely what you are going to do with their data.
  • As Google tries to misdirect the FTC antitrust investigations toward Apple and away from Google, Apple has the same ability to boomerang FTC concerns about privacy back at Google.

In sum, Google remains its own worst enemy. It serially tattles to regulators and antitrust authorities about the slightest thing others do to Google, all while Google routinely operates well beyond the accepted boundaries of antitrust, copyright, privacy, and security.

Those in glass houses should not be pathological stone-throwers.

 

Google’s CEO Eric Schmidt, dismissed the notion that Google was “arrogant” in an FT interview.

  • Mr. Schmidt: “The arrogance comes across because we trying to do things for end-users against organised opposition from stakeholders that are unhappy — and they paint us as arrogant. But I am sure that all successful organisations have some arrogance in them.”

It seems to me that “the arrogance comes across” with Google because Google operates, and expects to operate, under a double standard — where rules, laws and expectations apply to others, but do not, and should not, apply to Google — because Google is somehow special.

The latest example of Google’s expectation to be treated differently and better than Google treats everyone else — is Google’s “permissions” policy. (See the Goobris Series below for other examples.)

Only Googlers would not see the irony or hypocrisy in requiring others to seek Google’s permission when Google maintains it needs no one’s permission to do its business.

This special treatment/double standard appears to be a well worn pattern for Google. Consider:

  • No one can use Google property without permission, but Google can copy 12 million books without permission or payment.
  • No one can infringe on Google’s trademarks or copyrights, but Google-YouTube can copy/infringe the copyrights of tens of thousands of TV shows and movies without permission or payment.
  • Competitive broadband providers must be neutral and not discriminate, but Google’s search advertising monopoly does not have to act neutrally and can discriminate against competitors.
  • The FCC’s Open Internet regulations should apply only to broadband information services but not to Google’s information services.
  • Consumers should have to pay more for more bandwidth use, but Google should not. (See paras 106 & 103/104/112 of the FCC’s proposed rules.)
  • The FTC should not investigate Google for antitrust despite the FTC determining Google has market dominance, but the FTC should investigate Apple for antitrust when Apple has not been found by the FTC to be dominant.

In sum, Goobris is Google expecting that all the rules, laws and standards that apply to others — do not, and should not, apply to Google — because Google is special.

Goobris Series:

Goobris defined: See Goolossary at www.GoogleMonitor.com

Goobris I: “Goobris”

Goobris II: “Goobris Alert: ‘We want to be Santa Claus’”

Goobris III: “Clueless Goobris”

Goobris IV: “Schmidt Goobris: ‘we should have 100% share.’”

Goobris V: “Real Discrimination Goobris — Google’s hiding its EEO track record”

 

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE  

May 25, 2010

Contact: Scott Cleland

703-217-2407 

 

 

Google’s U.S. Economic Impact Analysis is a Misleading Accounting Gimmick:

“Google’s economic analysis includes all the benefits, but not all the costs”

 

 

WASHINGTON – Scott Cleland, Chairman of Netcompetition.org, released the following statement regarding Google’s release of “Google’s U.S. Economic Impact” report.  

 

  • “Google employs selective and misleading accounting gimmicks in calculating its “total” U.S. economic impact, by including all the benefits, but not all the costs of its economic impact on the U.S. economy, competition, and American workers.”
  • “Google’s PR sleight-of-hand totally ignores the destruction of revenues and jobs Google causes by abusing its market power to force content wholesale prices down to near zero for newspapers via Google News, for programmers via YouTube’s mass copyright infringement, and for authors and publishers via Google Books mass copyright infringement, to name only the most prominent Google value and job destruction examples.”
  • “A real useful number would involve honest accounting of Google’s net total economic impact on the U.S. economy, competition, and jobs, all benefits minus all costs. Any honest accounting would be much smaller than the selective and inflated PR number that Google is trumpeting.”

 

The link to Google’s U.S. Economic Impact Analysis is here: http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/05/googles-us-economic-impact.html

 

NetCompetition.org is a pro-competition e-forum representing broadband interests. See www.netcompetition.org.

###

 

Google’s wanton “wardriving,” i.e. detecting, accessing, and recording residential WiFi networks in 30 countries for over three years, was not simply a “mistake,” “inadvertent,” or an “accident” as the Google’s PR machine has spun it. The evidence to the contrary is overwhelming to anyone who bothers to examine it closely.

  • Google’s wanton wardriving was either: gross incompetence/negligence or wrongdoing.
    • Government investigators must determine for themselves via subpoena, whether or not anyone at Google, in a supervisory or management position, knew that this private “payload” data was being collected, and whether or not this private data had been accessed, copied, analyzed, or used by Google in any way.

The case for why Google’s wanton wardriving is more than just a “mistake.”

I. Identifying the questionable practice: “Wardriving”

It is obvious that the media and regulators have only scratched the surface of this problem because none have even researched the practice enough to use the appropriate dictionary term, “wardriving,” to describe what Google has been doing in 30 countries for over three years.

  • While Google will try and characterize “war-driving” as a benign practice with good purposes, much like many try to characterize p2p filesharing as benign, the cold reality is that wardriving is a common practice of hackers and cybercrooks to find and exploit peoples’ vulnerabilities so that they can more efficiently defraud them with phishing and other scams.
  • The more government officials learn about wardriving the more horrified they will become that Google was able to secretly collect, right beneath their noses, what constitutes the world’s largest and most complete map of which Internet users around the world are most vulnerable to being hacked, taken advantage of, or harmed.
    • Simply, Google created a dream “IP” phone book/map for cybercrooks and/or spy agencies to potentially target.
  • The risk that this global “easy target” list could fall into the wrong hands is not theoretical.
    • Cybercrook access: Google’s “crown jewel” and most sensitive security system, its password access control computer code (Gaia), was was stolen by hackers/intruders, per John Markoff’s important investigative journalism in the New York Times.
      • The most troubling part of this massive Google security failure is that Google cannot guarantee that this 600 gigabits of wardriving data was not breached, or if the intruders were able to secretly install “backdoor” access to Google’s “big table” omni-database for convenient access in the future. (See “Security is Google’s Achilles Heelseries.)
    • NSA spy access: Google reportedly is partnering with the top U.S. spy agency, NSA, after the big China-Google cyberbreach, per Ellen Nakeshima’s front page scoop in the Washington Post.
      • The other 29 foreign countries which Google systematically wardrived, now must be wondering which of their government or other sensitive personnel “targets” have been identified as vulnerable to hacking by Google and potentially the NSA.
    • Google condoning shady behavior: Look and see how many Google links and YouTube videos show the “how to” hack networks and computers.

II. Gross incompetence as a defense?

For Google to prove that this systematic wardriving was inadvertent or accidental, Google essentially has to plead gross incompetence. This is not an easy pill to swallow for the world’s #1 brand that depends on users believing that Google is sincere and competent in protecting their privacy and security when using Google.

  • Google has proven to be culturally averse to accountability and internal controls as I have copiously documented on my sister site www.GoogleMonitor.com under the “accountability” tab.
  • Erik Sherman of BNet cuts to the quick here with his outstanding analysis of how Google’s claim of a “mistake” is simply not credible. He asks about whether or not Google’s code was: documented; supervised; supervised competently; overseen by management; etc.
  • It is not credible that Google, the world’s leading crawler and organizer of information could have unknown, and unmanaged code on all its StreetView vehicles in 30 countries… that could go undetected for over 3 three years of operations and analysis by the hundreds of Googlers involved in StreetView… who were regularly vacuuming up vastly more, and qualitatively and quantitatively different, kinds of WiFi data than it was intended to accumulate… and no one else was involved but the lone orginal software developer that made this solitary lasting “mistake?”
    • To believe that we have to believe that no one at Google ever cross-checks, tests, understands, or reviews Google’s original code!
  • If Google is being truthful, the staggering list of supervisory, management, privacy, security, and internal controls breakdowns Google would have to admit to would be tantamount to admitting that the world’s #1 repository of the world’s private information has no systemic integrity.
  • It is also highly suspicious that if Google truly cares about privacy and safeguarding private data, why has there been no disclosure or reports of a single Google employee that was reprimanded, reassigned or fired over any of Google’s serial privacy scandals: Gmail; Google search; Google Earth; Street View; Latitude Geo-tracking; Google Picassa Facial Recognition; Google Translation; 411 voice recognition; Google Books; Google Docs; Google Buzz; cloud computing; DNA prints; Google-NSA partnership?
  • Accountability for Google requires robust management and internal controls systems like any other publicly-traded company, not a serial practice of asking for forgiveness when Google is caught, and not PR misdirection.

III. Wardriving eerily resembles other Google efforts.

It is not credible that Google was unaware that this pervasive and systemic wardriving practice was actually occurring, when wardriving is so similar in both goal and effect to so many other “free” or “crowd-sourced” activities that Google “openly” engages in.

  • Remember that another big potential benefit of a global map of vulnerable WiFi hotspots is to let the open wireless movement know where all potential wireless hotspots are, and that are “free” to use, so people can “share” others’ bandwidth with their implicit permission or piggyback others’ bandwidth illegally without their explicit authorization.
  • Moreover, what fuels Google’s business model is free or near free inputs: content, private information and bandwidth. Furthermore, there is a lot of evidence that Google aggressively tries to “change the world” from a place where it has to pay for the inputs it uses, to one where it does not have to pay for the inputs it uses.
    • Promoting “Free” content: Book authors and publishers have sued Google for illegally copying over 12 million books without permission.
    • Promoting “Free” wireless: Google has long supported “free” wireless, via its support for free unlicensed White Spaces spectrum; “open” regulatory conditions on the 700 MHz auction; its Nexus One experiment to commoditize wireless bandwidth; its “free” Android operating system to commoditize wireless applications; and its support of “free” community wireless networks via New America Foundation’s advocacy — where Google’s CEO is Chairman.
    • Promoting free software: Google strongly supports free/open source software for all software, but the software that runs Google’s monopoly search engine, auctions and quality score.
    • Promoting subsidized bandwidth: Google’s lobbying leadership for net neutrality and Title II common carrier regulation of broadband providers is all about de facto bandwidth subsidies for Google-YouTube’s world-leading bandwidth consumption.
    • Promoting Internet engineering changes: Google also is proactively working at all levels to make the web faster: by re-engineering the DNS (Domain Name System); by forcing websites to load content faster or have their search ranking lowered; by backing Measurement Lab to be the world’s bandwidth speed cop; and by collecting copious user network data via Google’s pilot program for ultrafast broadband.
  • Does it not stretch all credulity that a company that is so interested in every aspect of the Internet, making if faster, gaining access to whatever information it can crawl, and getting it all for free, knows absolutely nothing about a Google global three-year information collection effort that would dovetail perfectly with most all of their goals, projects and initiatives?

IV. Conclusion: What to expect.

In conclusion, expect multiple serious investigations of Google’s wanton wardriving around the world.

EU: Google should be deeply concerned about the EU’s investigation and reaction because the EU has very strict data protection laws and expectations. It is hard to fathom the EU not holding an aggressive and dismissive American monopoly like Google accountable for serial violations of its laws.

  • Google should be especially concerned of criminal penalties in Italy, given that Italian authorities have already criminally convicted three Google executives in absentia for YouTube not having sufficient internal controls to quickly pull down an obviously objectionable video of students bullying a disabled schoolmate.

U.S. Overall in the U.S., it is unlikely that Google’s well-known political influence will be able to snuff out Federal law enforcement investigations of Google’s wanton wardriving.

  • In part that’s because Google’s former top lobbyist, Andrew McLaughlin, who is now the Federal Government’s Deputy Chief Technology Officer, was just reprimanded yesterday by the White House for violating the Federal Records Act, and for violating the Administration’s code of ethics, because Mr. McLaughlin communicated with Google officials on matters relevant to Google.
  • Moreover, Google’s wanton wardriving effort is an unhelpful reminder of Google’s efforts to get Google a White House special waiver so that Google could track Americans who visit the White House website via YouTube, contrary to longstanding Clinton-Bush policy.

DOJ: It is likely that the FBI will have to investigate to ensure that Google’s systematic eavedropping effort via its wanton wardriving effort did not illegally record any personal VoIP phone calls without authorization.

State AGs: Various state privacy and communications laws may have been violated by Google as well, so some State Attorney Generals will likely be investigating, especially if they have any concerns that the DOJ/FBI/FTC are not taking the issue seriously enough.

FTC: The FTC appears to be losing patience with Google’s double speak of supporting privacy in their statements but exhibiting serial disdain for users in their business actions. This latest Google violation of privacy is so at odds with what the FTC says are its privacy policies and expectations for U.S. companies like Google, it will be very surprising if the FTC does not formally investigate Google’s wanton wardriving. If they don’t, Facebook and Google will rightly see it as a green light to continue pushing the privacy-publicacy envelope.

FCC: Don’t expect the FCC to see any need to respond to the data-driven evidence of Google’s actual wanton wardriving of the Nation’s last hundred feet to the home, because this FCC is preoccupied with preventing potential last mile problems everywhere in the country — except for Mountain View, California.

Congress: Political interest and bipartisan consensus is clearly increasing in Congress concerning privacy legislation, in large part because of Google and Facebook’s egregious privacy track records. This latest major Google privacy scandal, on top of the Google Buzz fiasco, and on top of Facebook’s serial moving of the privacy goal posts during the game, easily could increase support for Rep. Boucher’s important new privacy bill.

Consumer Groups: Given that Google’s unauthorized tracking efforts are increasingly spiraling out of control, there could be renewed interest in the recommendation of privacy groups to institute a national “Do not track List” modeled after the populist, simple, effective, and wildly successful FTC “Do not call” list, which prevents unwanted invasion of privacy from telemarketers calling one’s home.

The open question is if this latest major Google privacy scandal will be the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back for Google.

*****

 Publicacy vs Privacy Series:

Part I: The Growing Privacy-Publicacy Fault-line — The Tension Underneath World Data Privacy Day

Part II: Implications of User Location Tracking

Part III: Extreme Publicacy — Does Privacy Stand a Chance?

Part VI: Why FTC’s Behavioral-Ad Principles Are a Big Deal

Part V: Privacy prevailed in Facebook’s privacy-publicacy earthquake

Part VI: Do People Own Their Private Information Online?

Part VII: Where is the line between privacy and publicacy?

Part VIII: “Privacy is Over”

Part IX: “Interventional Targeting? “Get into people’s heads”

Part X: “Latest publicacy arguments against privacy”

Part XI: “The Web 2.0 movement is opposed to the privacy movement.”

Part XII: “No consumer control over the commercialization of their privacy?”

Part XIII: “Does new Government cookie policy favor publicacy over privacy? “

Part XIV: “Google Book Settlement “absolutely silent on user privacy”

Part XV: Yet more evidence of Google’s hostility to privacy

Part XVI: Poll: Americans strongly oppose publicacy & expect online privacy

Part XVII: FaceBook CEO throws privacy under the bus

Part XIII: Fact Checking Google’s privacy principles

Part XIX: Google’s Privacy “Buzz” Saw

Part XX: Facebook and Google in a race to the Privacy bottom?

Part XXI: Questions for Google on its latest act of Privacide
 
Part XXII: Exposing Google’s Systematic Privacy Vulnerabilities