Satirical Preview of Google’s Senate Antitrust Testimony — Google’s Pinocchio Defense Part X
September 13, 2011
Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, it is a real pleasure to be here today, and thank you again for not issuing that formal subpoena you had to threaten in order to compel us to testify.
Let me begin my testimony by taking this opportunity to divert the media’s attention from this hearing by making a series of Google public announcements that our news algorithms predict will bury news of today’s hearing on the second page of most search results.
- Yesterday, in a contest between the world’s fastest supercomputers, IBM’s “Watson” was defeated by Google’s “Knowitall” at Jeopardy, The Price is Right and the Wheel of Fortune.
- This week, the number of Google+ users surpassed Facebook as Google added 1.1 billion Google+ users “privately” without their permission in just the last month.
- Today, as a gesture of goodwill to the European Union, Google has agreed to buy Greece for €7.77 billion.
- Also today, Google’s “Knowitall” computer network became sentient and automatically renamed itself “Your Majesty.”
Now let me disarm the tension in this room by feigning humility and reciting some focus group-tested cliché mantras that our tracking algorithms tell us will be believed by 93.1459% of people in this relevant targeted audience: Don’t be evil; Google would never do anything to undermine the trust of users; Using Google is a choice; Competition is a click away; Not every website can come out at the top of the page; You can make money without doing evil; Google is not a monopoly; Big is not bad; We are for openness others for closedness; and We understand with success comes scrutiny.
That in a nutshell is our antitrust defense; so please move along, there is nothing to see here.
Before I go, I have been told by my Washington advisors it would be helpful if I feigned more humility and I apologized for what Google has been caught doing red-handed.
First, we are very sorry Google was forced by the DOJ to officially admit to knowingly committing criminal felonies over a period of several years in actively promoting illegal prescription drug imports into the U.S. and to having to pay a near record $500m in criminal fines to settle the matter. Honestly, we never intended to get caught.
Second, we are very very sorry that Federal Judge Chin and the DOJ opposed the Google Book Settlement because we illegally copied fifteen million books without the permission of, or payment to the copyright owners, and also attempted to corner the online market for orphan works. It never occurred to us that stealing was illegal.
Third, we are very, very, very, sorry for being forced to admit to deceptive privacy practices and to be on probation for twenty years in the FTC-Google Buzz privacy settlement. Google has always said one thing and done another, so we had no idea that misrepresentation on the Internet was considered a deceptive business practice. Who could have known that?
Fourth, we are very, very, very, very sorry, for being investigated by the FCC for effectively wiretapping tens of millions of Americans homes in the Google StreetView WiSpy scandal. We always thought that if an average person did not know how to encrypt their private information, passwords and email, they deserved to have their privacy violated.
Fifth, we are very, very, very, very, very sorry the DOJ had to threaten us with a Sherman Act monopolization case to stop us from colluding with Yahoo to corner the online advertising market in the proposed Google-Yahoo Ad Agreement in 2008. Frankly, we were surprised the DOJ could get so huffy about antitrust.
Sixth, we are very, very, very, very, very, very sorry the that discovery in the Viacom vs. Google copyright case showed Google knowingly infringed on hundreds of thousands of videos in order to corner the Internet video distribution market. At Google we call taking whatever content we want without permission “fair use” and “sharing,” not infringing or stealing.
Seventh, we are very, very, very, very, very, very, very sorry that in this difficult job market, the DOJ caught us colluding with five other companies, to restrain competition for highly-skilled employees to limit both the compensation and career opportunity of thousands of our employees. We are happy to report in this instance Google was not the only company caught breaking the law.
In conclusion, Google’s unique mission to organize the world’s information is not monopolistic. Our repeated clashes with law enforcement and the plethora of antitrust, criminal, privacy, property and other investigations of our company are just a big misunderstanding because Google’s ever-flowing innovations are so disruptive. Several years ago, Google’s founders chose a Tyrannosaurus-Rex as Google’s corporate mascot, and prominently installed a life size skeleton of a T-Rex at our Mountain View headquarters as a symbol of Google’s disruptive innovation. Every other dinosaur had to run faster and hide better because of the T-Rex’s constant disruptive innovation. Simply, where others see predation, Google sees innovation.
***
Google Antitrust Pinocchio Series:
Part IX: Google Locks-in Its One Click Away Defense
Part VIII: Google’s Deceptive One Click Away Defense
Part VII: Two fatal Flaws in Google’s Antitrust Defense
Part VI: Fact-Checking Google’s Antitrust Defense
Part V: “Google does not reap the benefits of significant network effects”
Part IV: Stress-Testing Google’s Top Ten Antitrust Defenses
Part III: ”Google-AdMob: ‘Its too new to dominate’”
Part II: Google: Antitrust’s Pinocchio?
Part I: What is “One click away?
Top Ten Flaws in DOJ’s Case Against AT&T – T-Mobile
September 1, 2011
The DOJ lawsuit against the AT&T – T-Mobile merger has many serious flaws that will make it difficult for the DOJ to meet its burden of proof in court that this merger is anti-competitive.
- Court cases are precedent, fact, and merit driven, and DOJ’s case is much weaker in those critical dimensions than most appreciate or reports indicate.
- (See DOJ’s release here and the DOJ’s complaint here.)
Importantly, if the DOJ ultimately cannot prove this merger is anti-competitive in a court of law, that official legal decision would make it legally difficult for the FCC to block the merger on competition grounds under the FCC’s public interest standard, especially given that the merger would bring more broadband speed more quickly to more Americans, and create jobs, which the FCC’s claims are their top public interest priorities.
- Simply, the precedents, facts, and merits are friends of the proposed AT&T-T-Mobile deal.
I. Summary of Top Ten Flaws in DOJ’s Case
- The DOJ’s own facts don’t support its national relevant market definition.
- The DOJ arbitrarily gerrymandered its market definition to exclude real and relevant market competition in a large geographic segment of the nation.
- The DOJ’s arbitrary nationalmarket definition completely ignores ~10% of their supposed “national” market.
- Implying #4 T-Mobile is the only important “maverick” competitor, essentially ignores how #3 Sprint also has many “maverick” attributes and capabilities that would survive the merger.
- The DOJ is arbitrarily ignoring its own longstanding precedent of defining the wireless market locally without any justification for this fundamental change.
- The DOJ is also trying to move the goalpost on what is an acceptable level of market concentration.
- The FCC’s competitive facts do not support the DOJ’s market definition or conclusion.
- The DOJ ignores and dismisses obvious market efficiencies.
- The DOJ’s charge the merger will substantially lessen competition in “product variety and innovation” completely ignores the plethora of facts from the handset, mobile OS and App markets to the contrary.
- Maybe most importantly, the DOJ complaint ignores the explosion of market facts that show how dynamic and fast-changing the mobile marketplace has become.
II. The Top Ten Serious Flaws in DOJ’s Case
First, the DOJ’s own facts don’t support its national relevant market definition.
The DOJ’s entire case rests on DOJ’s factually unsupported and contrived assertion that the relevant market is a national mobile wireless telecommunications services market when most of the market data/evidence the DOJ presents in its own complaint is local market based.
- Moreover, the combined local market shares DOJ presents in the top 100 markets vary wildly by local market, from a combined low of 17.4% in Toledo to a combined high of 65% in Baton Rouge — an extremely wide range of almost 4 times more from low to high.
- If the DOJ’s national market conclusion was factually sound, that what really drives this market is the nationalpricing plans of competitors’ offerings, why do the market shares of the top 100 local markets not show any perceptible statistical regression to some sort of national mean?
- Shouldn’t the data the DOJ chooses to present in order to make its case, at least statistically resemble their proposed conclusion?
- If the DOJ’s national market conclusion was factually sound, that what really drives this market is the nationalpricing plans of competitors’ offerings, why do the market shares of the top 100 local markets not show any perceptible statistical regression to some sort of national mean?
- It will be obvious to the court that competition in these local markets must be driven by local market factors that are completely different from “national pricing plans” that the DOJ claims determine the market’s overall competitive dynamics, e.g. the amounts and types of spectrum available, the market’s population density, its legacy wireline footprints and brand, the number of retail locations, among other local market factors.
Second, the DOJ arbitrarily gerrymandered its market definition to exclude real and relevant market competition in a large geographic segment of the nation.
Equally damning to the DOJ’s case is that as it tries to assert that the market is national, the DOJ is omitting the large part of the Nation that is not in the top 100 markets.
- It appears that DOJ has excluded this critical evidence and made no mention of this large segment of the Nation in its analysis, because these critical facts strongly undercut the DOJ’s assertion of a national market and their de facto conclusion that the merger would be effectively anti-competitive in all local markets of the nation.
How can the DOJ logically and legitimately claim that this merger threatens rural wireless competitors when it excludes from its analysis any discussion or combined market share data for rural markets?
- It appears the DOJ has excluded that local market data because it undermines their national market definition assertion, and because the combined shares in smaller markets are generally much smaller than in larger markets because of the competition from regional and rural competitors.
- A fair judge will naturally be suspicious of selective market facts that exclude relevant facts that most refute the DOJ’s market definition and anti-competitive conclusion.
Third, the DOJ’s arbitrary nationalmarket definition completely ignores ~10% of their supposed “national” market.
- The DOJ will have a hard time proving that value competitors Metro PCS and Leap Wireless, which serve 200 million Americans, and regional competitors like U.S. Cellular and Cellular South with significant local market shares, are irrelevant to this analysis, conclusion and case.
- And if the DOJ truly believes they are competitively irrelevant, why does the DOJ local market data include them at all? They can’t have it both ways.
Fourth, implying #4 T-Mobile is the only important “maverick” competitor, essentially ignores how #3 Sprint also has many “maverick” attributes and capabilities that would survive the merger.
DOJ’s case depends in large part on DOJ convincing the court to ignore the competitive existence and capabilities of Sprint, which has: ~50m customers, maverick pricing plans, industry-largest spectrum portfolio, and innovative technology leadership in partnering with ClearWire and LightSquared.
- To mangle metaphors here, the DOJ has to convince the court that the Sprint “elephant in the room” is really “chopped liver.”
Fifth, the DOJ is arbitrarily ignoring its own longstanding precedent of defining the wireless market locally without any justification for this fundamental change.
The DOJ has reviewed about a score of wireless mergers over the last decade and has evaluated them all on a local by local market basis, not a national market basis.
- The DOJ complaint is silent on why it has changed this longstanding procedure and precedent.
- If market conditions somehow have changed sufficiently to make it appropriate to define the market dramatically differently than the DOJ has defined it in repeated consent decrees approved by courts in the many legal and court precedents before this merger, then the DOJ must be able to successfully defend their fundamental change in precedent and procedure before this court.
- A core element of justice is equal treatment under the law. Without any explanation or justification to date, it appears the DOJ has made an arbitrary and capricious decision to gerrymander a selective ~90% “national” market” to capture this particular merger.
- A core element of fairness is that players in the game have the certainty that the goalposts won’t move as the player approaches the goal line.
- DOJ must be able to conclusively prove that it is treating the AT&T/T-Mobile merger no differently than it treats all other mergers the DOJ reviews.
Sixth, the DOJ is also trying to move the goalpost on what is an acceptable level of market concentration.
Context matters for fairness and equal treatment under the law.
The DOJ complaint effectively gerrymandered a selective market definition to arrive at the claim that this would be a 4-to-3 merger when in most large local markets it would be a 6-to-5 or 5-to-4 merger.
- This could be another arbitrary and capricious problem for the DOJ because the DOJ is silent on why the DOJ would approve an ostensible 2-to-1 satellite radio merger of XM-Sirius, or a 3-2 consolidation of search engines in Microsoft-Yahoo as competitive, but conclude definitively that somehow an ostensible 4-3 AT&T – T-Mobile is so anti-competitive that it did not even consider remedies to cure it that DOJ has successfully employed in many previous wireless mergers?
- Moreover, the court will probably want to know why this merger should be treated differently and more harshly than the alleged 3-to-2 Oracle-Peoplesoft merger that was approved by Federal Court.
Seventh, the FCC’s competitive facts do not support the DOJ’s market definition or conclusion.
The FCC’s latest wireless competition report shows that ~90% of Americans have a choice of five wireless competitors.
- How can the DOJ credibly claim that this is a 4-to-3 merger for ~90% of the national market when the U.S. Government’s most recent official data shows that it would be a 5-to-4 merger for 90% of the country?
Eighth, DOJ ignores and dismisses obvious market efficiencies.
The DOJ complaint’s entire treatment of efficiencies constituted only one sentence:
- “The defendants cannot demonstrate merger-specific, cognizable efficiencies sufficient to reverse the acquisition’s anticompetitive effects.”
The companies should have a field day in court “demonstrat[ing] merger-specific cognizable efficiencies” of this merger:
- Bringing 4G LTE broadband to 55 million Americans who otherwise would not get it;
- Upgrading T-Mobile’s 33m customers to 4G service that T-mobile would not have been able to provide on its own;
- Combining compatible GSM networks that can be integrated easily, seamlessly and cost-effectively;
- Creating scale and scope that financially justifies investment neither company could do alone;
- Correcting inefficient spectrum deficits in key markets; and
- Providing a host of other cognizable efficiencies.
In court, DOJ will not get away with asserting “because we say so” that there are no cognizable efficiencies.
- The DOJ will have the burden of proof to justify why the court should ignore all the efficiencies the companies can easily present and enumerate.
- Facts matter.
Ninth, DOJ’s charge the merger will substantially lessen competition in “product variety and innovation” completely ignores the plethora of competitive facts from the handset, mobile OS and App markets to the contrary.
Americans have more handset choice than most anywhere in the world — over 600 handset choices.
OS providers (Apple, Google-Android, RIM, Symbian) manufacturers (Apple, Samsung, LG, Nokia, Motorola, etc. are driving fantastic product variety and innovation in handsets.
- It is a huge reach for DOJ to prove that this merger will substantially lessen competition in product variety or innovation, because that dynamic has long not been practically controlled or driven by wireless providers.
Tenth, and maybe most importantly, the DOJ complaint ignores the explosion of market facts that show how dynamic and fast-changing the mobile marketplace has become.
The reality of technological convergence is that new competitive pressures are coming from virtually every direction: customer demand; integrated platform ecosystems: Apple, Google, Facebook, Microsoft-Skype, Amazon; device, hardware and accessory suppliers; applications providers and developers; cloud computing models; big box stores; etc.
At core, DOJ will be trying to convince the court that this is their father’s wireless market; it is not.
- If the companies can get the court to understand how dynamic, fluid, ever-changing, innovative, and vibrant the overall mobile ecosystem really is, it will be very difficult for the DOJ to prove, based on the preponderance of the evidence, that this 5-to-4 merger will substantially lessen competition.
III. Conclusion
In sum, the DOJ has the burden of proof to prove the AT&T-Mobile merger is anti-competitive.
- The DOJ has not helped its case by arbitrarily gerrymandering its market definition in direct contradiction to longstanding precedent, with no justification, and by ignoring important and relevant competitive facts.
Public assertions and lawsuits may persuade some merging parties to fold on their own, but being on the right side of precedent, facts and the merits will be required to win in court here.
Advantage to AT&T – T-Mobile in court.
In the end, the U.S. Government is highly-likely to approve the AT&T/T-Mobile merger, despite the significant opposition, because of three over-riding realities: 1) market/financial realities, 2)DOJ legal/precedent realities, and 3) FCC public-interest realities.
I. Market Reality:
T-Mobile’s leadership and owners have decided that they are unable and unwilling to invest what is necessary in order to compete going forward in the American 4G wireless market, and given that fundamental premise, the AT&T/T-Mobile merger is the optimal market outcome for T-Mobile’s customers and for competition.
- T-Mobile shopped itself for a good while in order to fully test its market options and ultimately chose to merge with AT&T as the best outcome for all concerned from its perspective.
So the key baseline fact grounding the DOJ/FCC’s decision processes here, is that T-Mobile’s leaders/funders are effectively exiting this business one way or another long term via merger, sale or benign neglect.
- While the U.S. Government has the authority to approve or disapprove this transaction, it has no authority or power to force T-Mobile’s German owners to invest the capital necessary to make T-Mobile a viable 4G competitor long-term.
- The cold financial reality here of the European Union’s crushing debt crisis and Germany’s de facto role as the EU banker of last resort, means there is no reasonable prospect that T-Mobile’s German owners and investors will change their mind or find the very large amount of capital T-Mobile needs in order to build out to be a fourth 4G national infrastructure in the United States when they have so many overwhelming needs for German capital in Germany, and in the EU overall to support the solvency of Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy, etc.
- What is also driving home the cold financial reality of market forces not being interested in building out a fourth national 4G infrastructure in the U.S. is that both new U.S. 4G infrastructure players, Clearwire and LightSquared, are partnering with #3 Sprintto create a stronger #3 competitor based on innovative new technologies and business models.
- What is driving the U.S. wireless market to consolidate from 4 main national 3G competitors to 3 main national 4G competitors, is not the AT&T-T-Mobile merger, but the capital markets reality of a European debt crisis coupled with an anemic economy.
The other dimension of the market reality here is comparing the relative options available to T-Mobile.
- An independent T-Mobile may look appealing to some that have an unrealistic view of the market and financial realities discussed above, but the reality is that T-Mobile would be less and less competitive quickly over time without the necessary large capital investments in 4G infrastructure upgrades; and the longer the company went without necessary capital investments would mean T-Mobile rapidly would fall further and further behind competitively.
- Simply, T-Mobile knows it needs to consolidate, in order to best serve the long-term interests of its customers, employees and shareholders.
If staying independent is not viable long term, then which partner is best for T-Mobile’s customers, employees, and shareholders?
The overarching reason T-Mobile was not interested in being acquired by Sprint is the same reason Verizon logically was not interested in T-Mobile — i.e. technology incompatibility.
- T-Mobile has the same GSM infrastructure technology as AT&T meaning that they are a company/network combination that is relativelyeasy, efficient, inexpensive, and quick to integrate and operate.
- Sprint(-Nextel) on the other hand is a living and walking example of the extreme risk, complexity and difficulty of trying to merge, integrate, and operate different Sprint and Nextel technologies, infrastructures, and networks.
- Simply, T-Mobile is worth dramatically less to Sprint, Verizon, or anyone else because of the much higher relative cost and difficulty of technological integration and operation.
- T-Mobile combining with ClearWire or nascent LightSquared was also not a viable option for T-Mobile because those entities need massive capital at the same time that T-Mobile seeks to exit the U.S. market precisely because they do not have or want to supply the capital that these entities desperately need.
II. DOJ:
Why the DOJ ultimately will not block the AT&T/T-Mobile merger (which at worst is a 4 to 3 consolidation and in many markets is a 6 to 5 or 5 to 4 consolidation), is that the DOJ knows that there is slim chance the courts would support a DOJ injunction to block the acquisition, because it would be viewed as capricious by the court based on the DOJ’s very long history of precedents (several) in evaluating these wireless markets on a local (not national) market basis, and also given the DOJ’s 2008 approval of the ostensible 2 to 1 XM-Sirius consolidation that has not proven anti-competitive three years later.
Moreover, given that the DOJ has a tried and true system of divestiture remedies that have worked in the past, and given that AT&T has signaled it would be amenable to divestitures in select potentially problematic markets in this merger, a DOJ attempt to block AT&T-T-Mobile in court would have a steep uphill argument to justify that the DOJ did not “move the goalposts” in the middle of the game, and act in an arbitrary and capricious way (given the facts of DOJ’s previously-approved wireless mergers, T-Mobile’s clear determination in exiting the market, and the fact that it was T-Mobile which reached out to AT&T to merge, not the other way around.)
Furthermore, this DOJ knows that the facts and precedents of this case make it a loser legally in court, if the DOJ were to somehow gamble and try to legally challenge this acquisition in Federal Court.
III. FCC Reality:
This FCC has loudly and consistently declared that its highest priority is accelerating more and faster broadband to all Americans, when arguably the single decision the FCC could make to most quickly and effectively advance its top priority and broadband goals would be to approve the AT&T-T/Mobile merger.
Moreover, the Administration proposed a wireless broadband deployment initiative to reach 98% of Americans by ~2016 (that would require passage of new legislation and implementation of new government implicit subsidies), while this AT&T/T-Mobile merger would achieve virtually all of the President’s goal, in a similar or faster timetable, with much greater likelihood of timely success, and without any need for Government legislation or subsidy.
Furthermore, it will be extremely difficult for the FCC, which claims to be supportive of the President’s Executive Order to minimize government actions or regulations that would slow economic growth and hurt job creation, to regulate or effectively ban this merger’s economic growth and job creation benefits.
It is also hard to see how the FCC would be able to argue persuasively that blocking the merger would be good for the economy or jobs, when 26 Governors and the unions affected strongly support the merger.
The FCC reality is that they have already clearly defined this FCC’s public interest standard to de facto be promoting accelerated broadband deployment in their National Broadband Plan and that the Administration has defined a new de facto public interest standard for independent regulatory agencies in his Executive Order:
- “Executive Order 13563 of January 18, 2011, “Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review,” directed to executive agencies, was meant to produce a regulatory system that protects “public health, welfare, safety, and our environment while promoting economic growth, innovation, competitiveness, and job creation.” Independent regulatory agencies, no less than executive agencies, should promote that goal.”
IV. Conclusion:
In sum, despite the false and unsupportable claims that this merger would create a duopoly, three key realities — severe market capital constraints, favorable DOJ legal precedents, and new FCC/Administration de facto public interest standards — all point to the AT&T/T-Mobile merger ultimately getting DOJ and FCC approval.
Google’s Rogue WiSpy Invasive Behavior Proliferates — Security is Google’s Achilles Heel — Part XIII
June 17, 2011
Evidence continues to mount that Google’s management and supervision of its Android operating system is out-of-control when it comes to protecting privacy and security.
- Google’s corporate ethos that it is better to “ask for forgiveness than permission” increasingly means Android has no privacy by design and hence less security for users by default.
- Requiring and respecting the need for permission and authorization is a bedrock truism of IT security — and the evidence below increasingly indicates that Google has a deep aversion to that IT security truism.
Consider the growing pattern of Google’s default design and behavior that maximizes collection of private information, which inherently puts users at greater security risk.
First, and profoundly disturbing, is a new TechRepublic revelation in a post by security blogger Donovan Colbert.
In setting up his new Android-based tablet, Mr. Colbert discovered that the Android operating system by default, i.e. without permission, automatically collected and implemented encrytion key passcodes to automatically gain access to private networks without the permission of the user. In Mr. Colbert’s own words:
- “Google is not only storing a list of what hotspots you have visited, but any private encryption keys necessary to connect to those hotspots in the cloud.”
- “The idea that every Android device connects with that access point shares our private corporate access keys with Google is pretty unacceptable.”
- “Honestly if there is any data that shouldn’t be harvested, stored and synched automatically between devices, it is encryption keys, passcodes and passwords.”
Second, we learned from WSJ privacy reporting that Google Android tracked users location a thousand times a day without the users’ meaningful permission.
- This Google no privacy by design revelation prompted congressional hearings, the scandal moniker “locationgate,” and new legislation from Senators Franken and Blumenthal.
Finally, how does this pattern involve the WiSpy scandal of Google being caught wardriving tens of millions of homes, in over thirty countries, for over three years, eavesdropping on unencrypted home WiFi routers and recording all signals including emails, and passwords.
As you may remember, Google said that systematic eavesdropping on citizens, was the mistake of one engineer, and not at all sanctioned by the company at large.
Here is Google’s 5-14-10 official story:
- “So how did this happen? Quite simply, it was a mistake. In 2006 an engineer working on an experimental WiFi project wrote a piece of code that sampled all categories of publicly broadcast WiFi data. A year later, when our mobile team started a project to collect basic WiFi network data like SSID information and MAC addresses using Google’s Street View cars, they included that code in their software—although the project leaders did not want, and had no intention of using, payload data.“
However if Google was being forthright that it’s Android effort indeed did not want to by default to collect the maximum private information possible, why did Google mobile engineering manager Dave Burke tell the Guardian 1-29-08, the following that shows it was obviously Google’s policy to collect the most WiFi information possible…
- “If you’re going to concentrate on location you want every bit of data you can…”
- “…Cell ID is one location, the address of your Wi-Fi access point is another. The end result is that we want the user to have the best possible experience, and we’ll do whatever it takes to get it … to us they’re just network signals and we’re interested in all of them.
- The big takeaway here is that Google’s corporate priority is to collect the maximum amount of information by most any means, without meaningful permission or authorization, as fast as possible.
- This means that Google effectively has a “no privacy by design” approach to privacy, and that security is a lesser priority at Google
***
Previous parts of the “Security is Google’s Achilles Heel” Series:
- Part I: “Why security is Google’s Achilles heel”
- Part II: “Google values security much less than others do”
- Part III: “Google: “Security is part of our DNA” (Do Not Ask)
- Part IV: “Why Security is Google’s Achilles Heel”
- Part V: “Google Apps Security Chief is a magician/mentalist”
- Part VI: “Google-China: Implications for Cybersecurity”
- Part VII: “Did Google Over-React to China Cybersecurity Breach?”
- Part IX: “Google’s Titanic Security Flaws”
- Part X: : “A Google Android Botnet Problem”:
- Part XI: “Google’s Deep Aversion to Permission”
- Part XII: “Top Ten Reasons Google Has Culpability in the Gmail Data Breach”
For even more information, see the Security section of PrecursorBlog’s sister site: www.GoogleMonitor.com; or read the “Security is Google’s Achilles Heel chapter of my Book: Search & Destroy Why You Can’t Trust Google Inc. at www.SearchAndDestroyBook.com.
The Rural Cellular Association’s opposition to the AT&T/T-Mobile acquisition puts a spotlight on the un-sustainability of the analog rural cellular model that is on the wrong side of broadband change.
- The clear but unspoken subtext of the RCA’s opposition is their recognition that their current subsidized model of rural cellular providers is fundamentally ill-equipped for the competitive broadband era.
- Simply, the RCA is quixotically trying to drag the anchor of an inefficiently and unsustainably subsidized analog business model into the efficient and competitive broadband Internet future – a recipe for losing the future.
Importantly, most of the RCA’s problems exist completely separate from this transaction.
- This transaction just creates a prime opportunity to engage in regulatory capitalism and artificially create the fiction of a competitive model by seeking regulation that makes competitors implicitly, and taxpayers explicitly, subsidize rural cellular providers, regardless of whether it is pro-competition or pro-universal service or not, but simply because that was the way the old dying voice subsidy system worked.
- Providing masking-tape and rubber-band fixes to a rapidly dying industry model only undermines and delays the benefits of the new technology and the vastly superior economics, functionality, efficiencies, and productivity it can provide to most all but ~15% of the Nation’s rural consumers.
I. Wrong Side of Change
RCA providers find themselves on the wrong side of change from: technology, consumer demand, economics, competition, and government budgets.
- Technology: We are in an obvious and inexorable transition from RCA’s legacy analog-voice technology model of the past, to the diverse broadband Internet-Protocol technology model of the future, that enables much more than voice: broadband Internet, voice, video, and near-infinite applications.
- Consumer Demand: Since technology now enables it, consumers are demanding more — increased functionality, value and innovation of broadband services – than cellular rural providers’ technology and model provides.
- Competition: Increasingly rural cellular providers are seeing a market that has passed them by, one that is less driven by rural geography and cellular voice and more driven by reaching the world and using any broadband IP application.
- Network: The legacy analog voice network based on copper line economics is dying, with over half of all local copper access lines lost to other facilities-based competitors and roughly ten percent more are going away every year.
- In short, the underlying copper-infrastructure undergirding rural cellular’s copper-subsidized business model is unlikely to survive the end of this decade.
- Economics: Since technology, consumer demand, competition and the network has radically changed the expected value proposition, the economics of rural cellular has also changed radically; now forward-looking competitive broadband economics are vastly superior to backward-looking subsidy and regulation-based voice economics.
- Government Budgets: The Great Recession and the resultant unprecedented Federal, State and Local budget deficits mean resources are meager at best to continue to subsidize unsustainable technologies and business models.
It is unrealistic for rural cellular providers to ignore all the changes above and imagine they can politically drag their subsidized past into the more efficient broadband future via blocking or conditioning a legal AT&T/T-Mobile transaction.
If authorities look at this transaction through the appropriate lens of how it provides large new benefits to millions of rural customers, rather than how the transaction exposes the relative inefficiencies of the wrong-side-of-change rural cellular competitors, the transaction is clearly pro-competition.
- Put another way, denying rural consumers the competitive benefits and coverage-efficiencies of the AT&T/T-Mobile transaction because it offers more value to rural customers than rural cellular competitors would not be competition-centric analysis but competitor-centric analysis.
- Central to competition is the freedom, within antitrust limits, to provide more efficient and economic combinations and offerings to consumers than a competitor.
RCA has essentially framed its opposition to the transaction as a catch-all regulatory wish list for industry-wide price regulations, and inter-carrier/USF subsidies that are inappropriate to decide in a merger context.
II. Competition Can Now Outperform Regulation for Most of Rural America
One of the biggest revelations of this merger is that competitive models, without any government subsidies, can provide 4G LTE broadband service to the vast majority (~85%) of rural customers.
- (AT&T has pledged to provide 4G LTE broadband service to 97% of the United States; the U.S. Census Bureau claims ~20% of the U.S. population is rural, so AT&T would be providing coverage to ~17 of the ~20% — or ~85% of U.S. rural consumers without subsidies.)
What this shows is that the wireless broadband economies of scale from a competitive AT&T/T-Mobile transaction transform rural broadband economics.
- It suggests that Congress and the FCC should reexamine and update their assumptions in law and the National Broadband Plan about what percent of the population requires subsidies to get broadband, if 97% of the population can get 4G LTE broadband service competitively.
- This proposed transaction suggests that the market economics of providing near universal broadband service via wireless is more economical and efficient than the economics of laying copper/fiber over long distances for few users.
It is instructive to compare what portion of the country RCA providers provide coverage (see green RCA map) versus what AT&T/T-Mobile offers in seventeen state maps.
- These maps show the RCA model no longer best serves the mostrural providers.
- These maps (RCA’s and AT&T’s state maps) show how in at least eleven big states, representing almost half of the country’s area, RCA providers offer little coverage, while a combined AT&T/T-Mobile would offer extensive 4G LTE coverage in: Kentucky, Pennsylvania, California, North Dakota, New York, Louisiana, Minnesota, South Carolina, Indiana, Texas, and Michigan.
- The big takeaway here is that AT&T without subsidies is going to reach vastly more rural consumers than RCA providers can serve.
In extremely tight financial times, why not have competition and market forces provide near universal broadband service to the Nation without the cost of the inefficient subsidy structure of the past?
III. Conclusion
In sum, RCA opposition to the AT&T/T-Mobile acquisition is more about protecting and more deeply subsidizing RCA members dying business model that is completely on the wrong side of change, than it is about best serving American consumers, both rural and urban.
In essence, RCA’s message is don’t let their competitors and market forces create efficiencies, economies or new benefits that RCA providers cannot provide.
- RCA’s approach is about trying to delay the inevitable losing model, by forcing competitors and taxpayers to subsidize a losing model and also preventing a winning alternative that provides major benefits over what they have today.
- RCA’s approach is a recipe for losing not winning the future, because winning the future involves permitting antitrust-legal combinations that provide large increases in functionality, value, and innovation.